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ACCESSORY LIABILITY IN TORT AND EQUITY 
Unlike the position in criminal law, there does not currently 
exist a general doctrine of accessory liability in civil law. 
Thus, a person may be liable as an accessory in equity for 
dishonestly assisting with a breach of trust, but there is no 
tort for dishonest assistance. Rather, one who participates in 
another’s tort will only be liable if he is a joint tortfeasor 
acting pursuant to a common design with the primary 
tortfeasor. This article examines the reasons for this 
divergence and evaluates the case for their assimilation. It 
observes that, contrary to common perception, the scope of 
participatory liability in both spheres does not materially 
differ. It also concludes that the case for assimilation is not 
made out if the overarching principle for civil accessory 
liability is defined principally by reference to criminal 
concepts of complicity. Such an approach overlooks the 
fundamental distinctions between civil and criminal 
processes and threatens to extend civil liability beyond 
acceptable bounds. 
LEE Pey Woan* 
LLB (Hons) (London), BCL (Oxford);  
Barrister (Middle Temple), Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore);  
Associate Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
1 In civil as well as criminal law, a person may be liable when he 
participates in the wrong of another. Such liability is variously described 
as “accessory”, “secondary” or “derivative” because it is contingent upon 
a wrong being committed by the primary wrongdoer. In criminal law, 
a general doctrine of accessory or secondary liability exists which 
applies uniformly to all crimes. In contrast, there does not currently 
exist a unified doctrine of accessory liability in private law.1 This 
absence of a common approach in the civil realm is particularly striking 
when one considers the distinct approaches in tort and equity. In tort 
law, participatory liability is traditionally analysed under the rubric of 
                                                          
* The author would like to thank Professor Paul Davies and Assistant Professor Yip 
Man for reading and commenting on an earlier draft of this article, Professor Yeo 
Tiong Min for discussing the issues raised here, and the editors of this special issue 
for their comments. The usual caveat applies. 
1 This is true for both Singapore and England. In Singapore, the question whether 
there ought to be a general principle of accessory liability has not been considered 
by our courts, though the High Court has in Zim Integrated Shipping Services Ltd v 
Dafni Igal [2010] 2 SLR 426 commented obiter (at [22]) that the suggestion to 
amalgamate accessory liability in tort and equity is “attractive”. 
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“joint tortfeasance”. A person who participates (by authorising, 
procuring or assisting in another’s tort) is liable with the primary 
wrongdoer as a joint tortfeasor if such participation is made pursuant to 
a common design.2 That aside, there is no accessory liability for knowing 
assistance of another’s tort.3 Equity, on the other hand, characterises a 
person who induces, procures or assists with a breach of trust or 
fiduciary obligation as an accessory.4 The accessory is not liable for 
having committed the breach himself, but for procuring or assisting 
such breach. In addition, equity relies on the concept of “dishonesty” to 
curtail liability, while tort law employs the notion of “common design” 
for that end. 
2 This somewhat untidy state of the law has been criticised, for if 
all instances of accessory liability are in substance a single phenomenon, 
underpinned by the common objective of visiting responsibility on 
those who have deliberately participated in the commission of 
another’s wrong, why should the rules differ according to what primary 
wrong (tort, contract or fiduciary obligation) has been committed? 
Commentators critical of this state of the law have advocated judicial 
reform. For example, Sir Leonard Hoffmann (as he then was) had in an 
extra-judicial comment5 called for the abolition of the equitable action 
                                                          
2 Closely related to this form of joint tortfeasance is the tort of inducing breach of 
contract, but which has been characterised as a type of accessory liability: See 
OBG v Allan [2008] 1 AC 1 at [3] and [172]. Inducing breach of contract will not, 
however, be considered in this article given the focus on accessory liability for 
tortious and equitable wrongs. 
3 CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc [1988] 1 AC 1013; Credit 
Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Export Credit Guarantee Department [1998] 
1 Lloyd’s Rep 19 (affirmed on appeal: [1999] 2 WLR 540); Sea Shepherd UK v 
Fish & Fish Ltd [2015] 2 WLR 694. 
4 “Knowing receipt” is not included here as a form of equitable accessorial liability as 
current orthodoxy appears largely to favour the view that recipient and assistance 
liability are founded on distinct conceptual bases: see Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn 
Bhd v Tan [1995] 3 WLR 64 at 70 (although Lord Nicholls’s suggestion that 
recipient liability is restitution-based has not been accepted in Singapore: see Wee 
Chiaw Sek Anna v Ng Li-Ann Genevieve [2013] 3 SLR 801 at [108] and [110] and 
Raymond Zage III v Ho Chi Kwong [2010] 2 SLR 589 at [43]). See also Charles 
Harpum, “The Stranger as Constructive Trustee: Part I” (1986) 102 LQR 114; 
Charles Harpum, “The Stranger as Constructive Trustee: Part II” (1986) 102 LQR 267; 
and Yeo Tiong Min, “The Right and Wrong of ‘Knowing Receipt’ in the Law of 
Restitution” Yong Pung How Professorship of Law Lecture, Singapore 
Management University (19 May 2011) at para 18, available at 
<http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/yph_lect/4>. Note, however, that there are cogent 
arguments to the contrary: see Pauline Ridge, “Equitable Accessorial and Recipient 
Liability in Singapore” [2013] Sing JLS 361 at 374–378. 
5 Leonard Hoffmann, “The Redundancy of Knowing Assistance” in The Frontiers of 
Liability vol 1 (Peter Birks ed) (Oxford University Press, 1994). See also Georgina 
Andrews, “The Redundancy of Dishonest Assistance” [2003] Conv 398 at 408, who 
argued for abolishing equitable dishonest assistance in favour of a “tort of 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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for dishonest assistance, preferring instead to assimilate common law 
and equitable liability for third party interferences under the “general 
principle” of Lumley v Gye.6 A broader approach was advocated by Philip 
Sales, who would, by analogy with criminal accessory liability, unify 
various instances7 of “civil secondary liability” under a common 
analytical framework.8 This call for harmonisation has since been 
expanded by David Cooper9 and Paul Davies.10 Though differing in 
details, both Cooper and Davies forcefully argued for a single doctrine 
of civil accessory liability to apply across tort, contract and equity. On 
this view, “knowing assistance” would constitute a sufficient form of 
accessory liability both at common law and in equity.11 
3 This article considers how participatory liability differs in tort 
and equity and evaluates the case for their assimilation. It observes that, 
contrary to common perception, the scope of participatory liability in 
both spheres does not materially differ. This is because despite their 
distinct conceptual underpinnings, both sets of rules are ultimately 
unified by the common aim of restricting liability to minimise 
interference with liberty of action. Consequently, liability in both 
regimes is constrained by tight (though dissimilar) concepts of mental 
fault. This article also concludes that the case for assimilation is not 
made out if the overarching principle for civil accessory liability is 
defined principally by reference to criminal concepts of complicity. Such 
an approach overlooks the fundamental distinctions between civil and 
criminal processes and threatens to extend civil liability beyond 
acceptable bounds. 
                                                                                                                               
intentionally assisting with a breach of trust or intentional interference with a 
fiduciary relationship”. 
6 (1853) 2 E&B 216. 
7 Including inducing breach of contract, joint tortfeasance, dishonest assistance with 
breach of trust and conspiracy by unlawful means. 
8 Philip Sales, “The Tort of Conspiracy and Civil Secondary Liability” (1990) 
49 Camb LJ 491. See also Lee Eng Beng, “A Perspective on the Economic Torts” 
[1996] Sing JLS 482 at 500. In a similar vein, Lord Millett argued, in his dissent in 
Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164 at 201, that mental elements of equitable 
assistance liability and inducing breach of contract in tort ought to be similar as the 
former is merely an equitable counterpart of the latter. 
9 David Cooper, “Secondary Liability for Civil Wrongs” PhD thesis, University of 
Cambridge (1995). 
10 Paul Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart Publishing, 1st Ed, 2015). 
11 Dietrich has similarly argued for unifying civil accessory principles but in the more 
limited context of expanding accessory liability in tort: see Joachim Dietrich, 
“Accessorial Liability in the Law of Torts” (2011) 31 Legal Studies 231. 
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I. Accessory liability 
4 It is necessary to state at the outset that “accessory liability” is 
not a term of art. It does not bear a stable meaning in all contexts. The 
terminology is more entrenched and better developed in criminal than 
in civil law,12 but even there it connotes more than one meaning.13 Thus, 
in the context of English common law,14 an “accessory” may describe a 
person who (a) commits an inchoate offence (such as criminal conspiracy); 
(b) knowingly aids, abets, counsels or procures another to commit an 
offence;15 or (c) participates pursuant to a criminal joint enterprise.16 
Although the basis of liability differs across these distinct contexts, the 
term “accessory” is used in each context to describe the person who is in 
some way involved in a criminal plan or conduct though he is not the 
primary perpetrator. 
5 Those advocating the assimilation of civil accessory liability law 
typically do so by reference to the doctrine of secondary liability in 
criminal law, which is exemplified by category (b) above. Under this 
doctrine, a person who (a) knowingly (b) aids, abets, counsels or 
procures another to commit an offence, and (c) the offence is in fact 
committed, is liable as an accessory for the commission of that primary 
                                                          
12 This may be because criminal law has traditionally viewed offences committed by a 
group of persons more seriously, “inasmuch as they suggest planning and 
determination to offend and make it difficult for an individual to withdraw, and 
because group offences against an individual tend to be more frightening”: see 
Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 6th Ed, 
2009) at p 403. 
13 A point made by Hobhouse LJ in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Export 
Credits Guarantee Department [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 19 at 42. 
14 Here, substantial reference is made to English principles of criminal law as 
commentators who have argued for the unification of accessory liability in civil law 
typically did so by reference to principles of English law. 
15 In England, this form of liability is now reflected in s 8 of the English Accessories 
and Abettors Act 1861 (c 94). In Singapore, the Penal Code adopts a simpler 
scheme which subsumes the offence of aiding and abetting within the inchoate 
offence of abetment, thus obviating the need to prove the commission of the 
primary offence: see s 107 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed). That does 
not, of course, alter the fact that liability is accessorial in nature when the abetted 
offence has in fact been committed. 
16 A criminal joint enterprise arises when one party, D, agrees with another, PW, to 
commit an offence and the offence is subsequently committed. This type of liability 
overlaps with but extends beyond accessory liability on account of aiding and 
abetting, as it may render D liable even for an offence that P commits but which 
was not intended by D: see United Kingdom, Law Commission, Participating in 
Crime (Cmnd 7084, May 2007) at paras 1.10–1.11. However, whether or not joint 
enterprises are true cases of accessorial or secondary liability is not entirely settled: 
at paras 3.47–3.56. In Singapore, joint enterprise liability is encapsulated by s 34 of 
the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed), but this provision is explicit that all parties 
are liable as joint principals. 
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offence. For liability to arise, the accessory’s participation need not be a 
“but-for” cause of the primary offence though it seems that it must have 
in some way “contributed” to that offence.17 In the absence of a distinct 
causative link, liability is justified by the fact of complicity (that is, the 
accessory’s participation), which serves as a sufficient nexus between the 
accessory and the primary offence.18 Sales,19 Cooper20 and Davies21 argue 
that accessory liability in civil law should be developed by analogy with 
this doctrine. For present purposes, the key implications of this 
approach are twofold: first, that consistently with the criminal doctrine, 
the modes of participation should be expanded to include assistance or 
facilitation of another’s civil wrong; and second, that the accessory need 
only have knowledge of the elements constituting the primary 
wrongdoing to be liable. Taking the analogy further, Cooper contends 
that civil accessory liability is also duplicative, so that the liability of the 
accessory should duplicate, or be “joint and equal”22 to, that of the 
primary wrongdoer. 
6 As shall be seen, however, the term “accessory liability” has not 
been employed in the civil realm with a view to importing its meaning 
from the criminal law. Thus, although the House of Lords has in OBG v 
Allan23 characterised the tort of inducing breach of contract as a form of 
accessory liability, one may not thereby infer that there exists also a tort 
of knowingly assisting or facilitating a breach of contract simply because 
such assistance is an accepted mode of participation in criminal law. 
This is not to deny that criminal law principles may be relevant in the 
development of their civil law counterparts, but one should resist the 
impulse to view the rules in criminal law as definitive. Whether the tort 
of inducing breach of contract should be so enlarged must ultimately 
depend on an evaluation of the policy concerns underlying that tort. 
7 “Accessory liability” is therefore used in civil law only as a 
shorthand for describing the liability that is imposed upon a defendant, 
                                                          
17 See the discussion in United Kingdom, Law Commission, Participating in Crime 
(Cmnd 7084, May 2007) at paras 2.31–2.33. 
18 See Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 
6th Ed, 2009) at pp 407–408. 
19 Philip Sales, “The Tort of Conspiracy and Civil Secondary Liability” (1990) 
49 Camb LJ 491 at 503 and 509–510. 
20 David Cooper, “Secondary Liability for Civil Wrongs” PhD thesis, University of 
Cambridge (1995) at p 2. 
21 Paul Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart Publishing, 1st Ed, 2015) at p 21. 
22 David Cooper, “Secondary Liability for Civil Wrongs” PhD thesis, University of 
Cambridge (1995) at p 153. The notion of secondary liability was subsequently 
adapted by Elliot and Mitchell to explicate the remedies for dishonest assistance in 
equity: see Steven Elliott & Charles Mitchell, “Remedies for Dishonest Assistance” 
(2004) 67 MLR 16. 
23 [2008] 1 AC 1 at [8] and [172]. 
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D, who has participated in a wrong committed by a primary wrongdoer, 
PW, against a plaintiff, P, with a culpable state of mind. However, 
precisely what conduct and states of mind would combine to constitute 
accessory liability may differ from one context to another. One cannot 
define these elements simply by invoking the “accessory” label. In this 
article, the term is also used in that general and descriptive sense unless 
the context indicates otherwise. 
II. Accessory liability in tort? 
8 In the law of torts, liability for participating in another’s tort is 
conventionally analysed as a form of joint liability. Leaving aside joint 
liability that is relationship-based,24 it is settled that D may be jointly 
liable with PW if D procured PW to commit a tort by inducement, 
incitement or persuasion, or if D otherwise took part in PW’s tort 
pursuant to a common design.25 
9 Although these principles are well established, it is as yet 
unclear whether procurement is a concept distinct from common 
design, or merely a subset thereof.26 On the whole, judicial dicta favour 
                                                          
24 Eg, the joint liability of a principal/employer for a tort committed by his 
agent/employee acting within the scope of his appointment. In these instances, 
liability is imposed not because the principal/employer had participated in the tort 
of the agent/employee but solely on account of the parties’ relationship. 
25 The Koursk [1924] P 140; CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc 
[1998] 1 AC 1013; Sea Shepherd UK v Fish & Fish Ltd [2015] 2 WLR 694. 
26 In Unilever plc v Gellette (UK) Ltd [1989] RPC 583 at 608, Mustill LJ preferred the 
view that procurement and common design are two distinct strands of joint 
liability. See also Hazel Catty, “Joint Tortfeasance and Assistance Liability” (1999) 
19 Legal Studies 490 at 492–500, which analysed procurement and combination as 
distinct modes of participation. One difficulty with this view is that there are 
relatively few occasions where joint tortious liability has been established only on 
the basis of procurement (ie, independently of common design). Some examples 
may be found among cases examining “procurement” for purposes of determining 
whether directors or company controllers were liable as joint tortfeasors for having 
procured or authorised their company’s torts: see, eg, C Evans & Sons Ltd v 
Spritebrand Ltd [1985] 1 WLR 317; Wah Tat Bank Ltd v Chan Cheng Kum  
[1974–1976] SLR(R) 284; Gabriel Peter & Partners v Wee Chong Jin [1997] 
3 SLR(R) 649; Niru Battery Manufacturing Co v Milestone Trading Ltd [2004] 
1 CLC 647; and TV Media Pte Ltd v De Cruz Andrea Heidi [2004] 3 SLR(R) 543. 
However, these cases are not particularly helpful in elucidating the concept of 
“procurement”. As Slade LJ had accepted in C Evans & Sons Ltd v Spritebrand Ltd 
[1985] 1 WLR 317 at 330, it is an “elusive question” to ask what a director must 
have done in order to be regarded as having procured or ordered the company’s 
tort. The best that can be said in this context is that what conduct by a director 
would count as participation is one of fact and degree to be determined by 
examining the level of his involvement in each case: Gabriel Peter & Partners v Wee 
Chong Jin [1997] 3 SLR(R) 649 at [35]. 
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the latter. Thus, in CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc,27 
Lord Templeman appeared to have suggested that the procurer is a joint 
tortfeasor only if he shares the design of the primary tortfeasor:28 
My Lords, I accept that a defendant who procures a breach of 
copyright is liable jointly and severally with the infringer for the 
damages suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the infringement. The 
defendant is a joint infringer; he intends and procures and shares a 
common design that infringement shall take place. [emphasis added] 
10 More recently, in Sea Shepherd UK v Fish & Fish Ltd29 
(“Sea Shepherd”), Lord Sumption cited the above passage to make the 
point that it is the fact of “common intent” that delineates liability as a 
joint tortfeasor. This is so even in cases of procurement, because 
“[i]nducing or procuring a tort necessarily involves common intent if 
the tort is then committed.”30 In a similar vein, Hacon J concluded in 
Vertical Leisure Ltd v Poleplus Ltd31 that:32 
From this I draw the conclusion that it will seldom if ever be possible 
to establish joint tortfeasance on the basis of procurement where there 
is no common design. Procurement is probably a species of common 
design. Procurement in its various forms – inducement, incitement 
and persuasion – is sometimes going to be the clearest way to show 
that there was a common design. 
11 These statements thus affirm “common design” as the essence of 
joint tortfeasance.33 The rationale, as Gibson LJ explained in SABAF 
SpA v Meneghetti SpA,34 is that a defendant who acted pursuant to a 
common design has by that conduct “made the tort his own”:35 
                                                          
27 [1998] 1 AC 1013. 
28 CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc [1998] 1 AC 1013 at 1058. 
29 [2015] 2 WLR 694 at [41]. The law lords in this case were divided 3:2 as to the final 
outcome. However, all their Lordships were largely in agreement as to what the 
applicable principles were, their disagreement pertaining only to how those 
principles should apply to the facts. So while Lord Sumption was in the minority, 
the majority did not disagree with his analysis of the law. 
30 Sea Shepherd UK v Fish & Fish Ltd [2015] 2 WLR 694 at [41]. 
31 [2015] EWHC 841 (IPEC). 
32 Vertical Leisure Ltd v Poleplus Ltd [2015] EWHC 841 (IPEC) at [26]. 
33 Cf Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v Newzbin Ltd [2010] FSR 21, where Kitchin J 
distinguished between procurement and common design but noted (at [103]) that 
“[t]here is considerable overlap between the two in that many circumstances will 
qualify under both heads”. 
34 [2003] RPC 14. This decision was reversed on other grounds on appeal, but the 
House of Lords appeared to have accepted that common design was the only route 
for establishing joint liability: see SABAF SpA v Meneghetti SpA [2005] RPC 10 
at [39]. 
35 SABAF SpA v Meneghetti SpA [2003] RPC 14 at [59]. In Sea Shepherd UK v Fish & 
Fish Ltd [2015] 2 WLR 694, Lord Neuberger criticised (at [59]) the “making the 
tort his own” formulation as “ultimately circular” and as being at risk of “being 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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The underlying concept for joint tortfeasance must be that the joint 
tortfeasor has been so involved in the commission of the tort as to 
make himself liable for the tort. Unless he has made the infringing act 
his own, he has not himself committed the tort. That notion seems to us 
what underlies all the decisions to which we were referred. If there is a 
common design or concerted action or otherwise a combination to secure 
the doing of the infringing acts, then each of the combiners has made the 
act his own and will be liable. [emphasis added] 
12 So understood, joint tortfeasance is conceptually distinct from 
accessorial liability as it is understood in the criminal context.36 A joint 
tortfeasor is not liable for mere participation in another’s tort, but for 
having adopted, by reason of the common design, the tort as a 
principal.37 It is, in other words, his tort, so there is no separate tort of 
procuring as an accessory.38 For the same reason, a person is not a joint 
tortfeasor merely because he has assisted with the commission of 
another’s tort. Mere assistance is not procurement.39 Nor is assistance 
necessarily proof of common design40 (though it may be).41 This may be 
so even if the assistor knew of the assisted person’s intention to commit 
a tort or to do the acts that constitute the tort, for though knowledge is 
necessary for inferring common design, it may not be sufficient in every 
case.42 
                                                                                                                               
interpreted as putting a potentially dangerous gloss on the need for a common 
design”. It is submitted, however, that the better view is that of Lord Toulson 
(at [24]), who understood the phrase as an explanation of the concept underlying 
joint liability and not as a test additional to the requirement for common design. 
36 Fish & Fish Ltd v Sea Shepherd UK [2013] 1 WLR 3700 at [45]. 
37 Robert Stevens explained joint liability as the result of attributing the primary 
wrongdoer’s actus reus to the defendant: see Robert Stevens, Torts and Rights 
(Oxford University Press, 2007) at pp 245–246. In Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland 
NV v Export Credits Guarantee Department [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 19 at 43 and 46, 
Hobhouse LJ explained the defendant’s liability by analogising with agency, in that 
once the tort is committed, the primary wrongdoer’s acts are taken to have been 
authorised by the defendant or within the implicit authority given by the defendant 
to the primary wrongdoer by reason of their common design. 
38 See John Hudson & Co Ltd v Oaten (CA) (19 June 1980) (unreported) and Smith v 
Pywell and Spicer (1959) 173 EG 1009, both approved by Lord Woolf MR in Credit 
Lyonnais NV v ECGD [1999] 2 WLR 540 at 549. 
39 Belegging-en-Exploitaiemaatschappij Lavender BV v Witten Industrial Diamonds 
Ltd [1979] FSR 59 at 65. 
40 CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc [1988] AC 1013 (“CBS Songs”); 
Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Export Credits Guarantee Department 
[1999] 2 WLR 540; Sea Shepherd UK v Fish & Fish Ltd [2015] 2 WLR 694. This 
aspect of CBS Songs has been affirmed by our courts on a number of occasions: see, 
eg, Ong Seow Pheng v Lotus Development Corp [1997] 2 SLR(R) 113 at [44]–[45] 
and Trek Technology (Singapore) Pte Ltd v FE Global Electronics Pte Ltd 
[2005] 3 SLR(R) 389 at [36]. 
41 See discussion at para 15 below. 
42 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Export Credits Guarantee Department 
[1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 19 at 42. 
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13 However, that is not to say that acts of assistance may never give 
rise to joint liability. Whether or not they do depends on proof of 
common design.43 Thus, if D lends his car to PW on the common 
understanding that PW would use it to steal and transport P’s goods, 
D is jointly liable with PW for converting P’s goods. Once the element of 
common design is proved, D’s assistance is a sufficient mode of 
participation if it is more than a de minimis contribution to PW’s tort.44 
Provided this minimal threshold is met, it is not necessary for 
D’s assistance to have played an “essential”45 or “indispensable”46 part in 
the commission of the tort. 
14 Because common design is often thought to require proof of 
agreement,47 it is usually difficult to establish common design when D 
has done no more than assist with or facilitate a tort. Absent evidence of 
an explicit agreement, assistance simpliciter does not normally give rise 
to an inference of agreement because it is usually rendered as part of an 
otherwise legitimate transaction. So if D sells an item to PW in the 
ordinary course of business, D is not usually acting in concert with PW 
even if D was aware of PW’s intention to use the item for a tortious 
purpose.48 As far as D is concerned, his intention is to conclude a sale 
and he is under no legal duty to police PW’s subsequent use of the 
article. He cannot therefore be said to have acted pursuant to any 
agreement or understanding. This is particularly so when the article 
may be put to both tortious and non-tortious uses, and D has no control 
over PW’s choice of use.49 
15 However, the assumption that “common design” necessarily 
connotes agreement has not been uniformly adopted. Notably, 
Lord Sumption has recently explicated “common design” largely as a 
                                                          
43 Sea Shepherd UK v Fish & Fish Ltd [2015] 2 WLR 694 at [41], per Lord Sumption. 
44 Sea Shepherd UK v Fish & Fish Ltd [2015] 2 WLR 694 at [26], [49] and [57]. 
Whether or not a particular act or acts exceed the de minimis threshold may, of 
course, raise difficult questions of fact and judgment. These difficulties were amply 
illustrated by the UK Supreme Court’s decision in Sea Shepherd UK v Fish & Fish 
Ltd [2015] 2 WLR 694, where the court held by a slender majority that an 
allegation of joint liability failed. Even though the parties had acted pursuant to a 
common design, the assistance rendered was found to have been de minimis. 
45 Fish & Fish Ltd v Sea Shepherd UK [2013] 1 WLR 3700 at [58]. 
46 Sea Shepherd UK v Fish & Fish Ltd [2015] 2 WLR 694 at [49]. 
47 See, eg, The Koursk [1924] P 140 at 155, where Scrutton LJ said that joint 
tortfeasors are “two persons who agree on common action, in the course of, and to 
further which, one of them commits a tort” [emphasis added]. 
48 Townsend v Haworth (1875) 48 LJ Ch 770; Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co, Ltd v David 
Moseley & Sons, Ltd [1903] 1 Ch 612; Belegging-en-Exploitaiemaatschappij 
Lavender BV v Witten Industrial Diamonds Ltd [1979] FSR 59; CBS Songs Ltd v 
Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc [1988] AC 1013. 
49 CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc [1988] AC 1013 at 1058. 
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requirement for intention. Thus, his Lordship observed in Sea 
Shepherd:50 
I do not think that in this passage Lord Templeman [in CBS Songs][51] 
was seeking to limit liability as a joint tortfeasor to cases of 
inducement or procurement, as opposed to assistance. When read 
with his general statement of the elements of liability as a joint 
tortfeasor, it is clear that he was intending to limit it to cases of common 
intent. Inducing or procuring a tort necessarily involves common intent if 
the tort is then committed. Mere assistance may or may not do so, 
depending on the circumstances. The mere supply of equipment which is 
known to be capable of being used to commit a tort does not suggest 
intent. Other circumstances may do so. [emphasis added] 
16 In a later passage, his Lordship explained that the element of 
intention is a critical mechanism for limiting liability:52 
Intent in the law of tort is commonly relevant as a control mechanism 
limiting the ambit of a person’s obligation to safeguard the rights of 
others, where this would constrict his freedom to engage in activities 
which are otherwise lawful. The economic torts are a classic 
illustration of this. The cases on joint torts have had to grapple with 
the same problem, and intent performs the same role. What the 
authorities, taken as a whole, demonstrate is that the additional element 
which is required to establish liability, over and above mere knowledge 
that an otherwise lawful act will assist the tort, is a shared intention that 
it should do so. The required limitation on the scope of liability is 
achieved by the combination of active co-operation and commonality of 
intention. It is encapsulated in Scrutton LJ’s distinction between 
concerted action to a common end and independent action to a similar 
end, and between either of these things and mere knowledge of the 
consequences of one’s acts. [emphasis added] 
17 This emphasis on intention is a logical consequence of the 
rationale underlying joint liability – that the defendant must have acted 
with a view to making the tort his own.53 For as Hacon J observed in 
Vertical Leisure Ltd v Poleplus Ltd, this requirement “connotes the taking 
of one or more steps intentionally and actively to bring about the 
infringing act” [emphasis added].54 On this view, D acts pursuant to a 
“shared intention” if he assists PW with the intention that PW should 
commit the tort in question. Importantly, D may form such intention 
                                                          
50 Sea Shepherd UK v Fish & Fish Ltd [2015] 2 WLR 694 at [41]. 
51 CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc [1988] AC 1013 at 1058. 
52 Sea Shepherd UK v Fish & Fish Ltd [2015] 2 WLR 694 at [44]. 
53 See discussion at para 11 above. This does not contradict Scrutton LJ’s statement in 
The Koursk [1924] P 140 at 156 that “mere similarity of design on the part of 
independent actors, causing independent damage, is not enough” for his Lordship 
was there concerned with independent actors causing independent damage. 
54 Vertical Leisure Ltd v Poleplus Ltd [2015] EWHC 841 (IPEC) at [39]. 
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independently of any agreement with PW. Such intention may, for 
example, subsist if D supplies a device that may be used for purposes 
that infringe P’s copyrights with “clear expression or other affirmative 
steps taken to foster infringement”.55 In such a case, it matters not that D 
has had no prior agreement or understanding with purchasers to put the 
device to such use. It is sufficient that D has, by his conduct, evinced the 
intention to bring about the latter’s infringement. That common intent 
may be inferred from D’s conduct does lead to a blurring of the mental 
(that is, common intention) and conduct (concerted action or 
co-operation) elements of joint liability.56 However, this is inevitable 
when D’s conduct is the only evidence from which his state of mind may 
be inferred.57 
18 Although this approach may appear to have extended the 
meaning of “common design” as conventionally understood, it is not 
without precedent. In Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v Newzbin Ltd58 
(“Newzbin”), the English High Court held that Newzbin Ltd 
(“Newzbin”), an operator of a Usenet indexing website that provided a 
facility (the “NZB facility”) that its members may use to download 
infringing materials, was jointly liable for the members’ infringement. 
Rejecting Newzbin’s argument that its facility was “content agnostic”, the 
court found that it had designed its services primarily to enable access 
to infringing materials. This was evidenced by the structure of its 
website (which guides users to the infringing materials of their choice), 
the provision of a specific means (the NZB facility) of downloading the 
materials, inducing and encouraging its editors to index copyrighted 
materials, and assisting its members to engage in infringing acts by 
giving advice on discussion forums. On these facts, the court was 
satisfied that Newzbin had “procured and engaged in a common design 
with its premium members to infringe the claimants’ copyrights”.59 This 
was so even though there was no evidence that it had conspired with 
specific members to commit the infringing acts.60 What was critical was 
that Newzbin had by its conduct clearly intended the subsequent 
infringing activities. 
                                                          
55 Sea Shepherd UK v Fish & Fish Ltd [2015] 2 WLR 694 at [43], contrasting Sony 
Corp of America v Universal City Studios Inc 464 US 417 (1984) and Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v Grosker Ltd 545 US 913 (2005). 
56 Fish & Fish Ltd v Sea Shepherd UK [2013] 1 WLR 3700 at [47]. 
57 Hence, it was accepted in Unilever Plc v Gillette (UK) Ltd [1989] RPC 583 at 609 
that “common design” need not be explicit but is inferable from parties’ conduct. 
58 [2010] FSR 21 at [111]. 
59 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v Newzbin Ltd [2010] FSR 21 at [112]. 
60 This was due in part to the inability to identify specific instances of infringements 
because the defendant had not kept a record of the files downloaded using the  
NZB facility: Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v Newzbin Ltd [2010] FSR 21 
at [110]–[111]. 
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19 The reasoning in Newzbin has since been employed in a number 
of other decisions involving infringement of intellectual property 
rights,61 but it is clear that the principle at work is of general application 
and hence not limited to that context. In Shah v Gale,62 it was held that a 
defendant who pointed out to her friends the address (which turned out 
to be wrong) of one XI knowing that they were intending to beat him up 
had, “expressly or by clearest implication, become part of the common 
design”.63 Lewison J concluded that this inference could properly be 
drawn from her act of assistance taking into account what she knew 
(that is, the assailant’s plot to assault XI) and her motive in helping them 
(that is, she was angry with XI for his previous harassments).64 Though 
not expressly analysed as such, this decision may be understood as an 
instance where the court was prepared to infer the defendant’s intention 
to join in the assault given her knowledge as well as her motive in 
rendering assistance.65 
20 From this survey, one may conclude that there does not 
currently exist in tort law a principle of accessory liability in the sense 
that it is understood in criminal law. A person may, however, be liable as 
a joint tortfeasor if he participates, by way of procurement or assistance, 
in another’s tort pursuant to a common design. The requirement for 
common design reflects the raison d’être of the principle – that liability 
will only be imposed if the defendant acted with the intention to adopt 
the tort as his own. An agreement (whether express or tacit) between the 
parties is always sufficient evidence of such intention, but it is not an 
essential ingredient of common design. In the absence of such 
agreement, the requisite intention may nevertheless be inferred from the 
defendant’s conduct. 
                                                          
61 See, eg, Dramatico Entertainment Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2012] RPC 27 
(the operators of a peer-to-peer file-sharing website (The Pirate Bay), who had 
structured the site such that infringement of claimants’ copyrights was not only an 
inevitable consequence but their very objective and intention, were jointly liable 
with users who downloaded infringing materials from that site); Football Dataco v 
Sportradar [2013] FSR 30 (a bookmaker which provided a web link that inevitably 
results in the copying of copyrighted data when clicked intended thereby to 
procure such infringement and was therefore jointly liable with punters who used 
the website); and EMI Records Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2013] FSR 31 
(the operators of peer-to-peer file-sharing website were jointly liable with users 
who downloaded infringing music files). 
62 [2005] EWHC 1087. 
63 Shah v Gale [2005] EWHC 1087 at [41] 
64 Shah v Gale [2005] EWHC 1087 at [36] and [41]. 
65 The defendant’s liability as a joint tortfeasor was, however, limited to the tort of 
assault. She was not liable for the victim’s eventual death as the court found that, 
not being aware of the assailants’ intention to attack the victim with a knife, she 
could not be said to have intended the infliction of grievous bodily harm on the 
victim: Shah v Gale [2005] EWHC 1087 at [44]–[50]. 
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III. Accessory liability in equity 
21 Accessory liability in equity has developed largely in connection 
with the breach of trust or fiduciary obligation.66 Though previously a 
distinction was drawn between procuring (or inducing) and assistance, 
the position since Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Philip Tan Kok Ming67 
(“Royal Brunei Airlines”) has been that accessory liability for breach of 
trust – whether by procurement or assistance – is governed by a single 
principle.68 For liability to accrue, D must have dishonestly induced or 
assisted PW (the trustee or fiduciary) to act in breach of trust or of a 
fiduciary obligation. In this context, dishonesty is primarily an objective 
concept. It is assessed by the standards of an ordinary honest person, so 
a defendant cannot escape liability simply by asserting that he did not 
appreciate that his conduct was dishonest by those standards.69 
                                                          
66 The principle governing accessory liability for breach of trust has been applied to 
other types of equitable obligations: see, eg, Thomas v Pearce [2000] FSR 718, 
where it was held that a third party in receipt of information disclosed in breach of 
confidence will himself owe a duty of confidence to the confider on the same 
principle as that for dishonestly assisting with a breach of trust. However, the 
English Court of Appeal has in the subsequent case of Campbell v MGN Ltd [2003] 
QB 633 declined to endorse Thomas v Pearce for the proposition that a third party 
recipient will only be liable for breach of confidence if he had acted dishonestly in 
disclosing the information. More recently, in Primary Group (UK) Ltd v The Royal 
Bank of Scotland plc [2014] RPC 727 at [230]–[233], Arnold J doubted whether 
Thomas v Pearce was truly concerned with accessory liability as the real issue 
appeared to be one of primary liability. 
67 [1995] 3 WLR 64. 
68 In Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Philip Tan Kok Ming [1995] 3 WLR 64 (“Royal 
Brunei Airlines”), Lord Nicholls characterised both assistance and procurement as 
instances of “accessory liability”: see Royal Brunei Airlines at 76, where his 
Lordship concluded that “[a] liability in equity to make good resulting loss attaches 
to a person who dishonestly procures or assists in a breach of trust or fiduciary 
obligation”. See also Charles Harpum, “Accessory Liability for Procuring or 
Assisting a Breach of Trust” (1995) 111 LQR 545 at 548. A similar stance was 
adopted by the Singapore courts: see Caltong (Australia) Pty Ltd v Tong Tien See 
Construction Pte Ltd [2002] 2 SLR(R) 94 at [33]; and George Raymond Zage III v 
Rasif David [2009] 2 SLR(R) 479 at [14]. Cf the position in Australia, where the 
distinction between assistance and procurement is maintained: Farah 
Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89. 
69 Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Philip Tan Kok Ming [1995] 3 WLR 64 at 73. This 
objective test was restored by Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Eurotrust 
International Ltd [2006] 1 WLR 1467, when it implicitly rejected the “combined” 
test adopted by the House of Lords in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164 
(that in addition to dishonesty by ordinary standards, the defendant must have 
subjectively appreciated that his conduct was dishonest by those standards). In 
George Raymond Zage III v Rasif David [2009] 2 SLR(R) 479 at [22], the Singapore 
Court of Appeal likewise affirmed that: 
… for a defendant to be liable for knowing assistance, he must have such 
knowledge of the irregular shortcomings of the transaction that ordinary 
honest people would consider it to be a breach of standards of honest conduct 
if he failed to adequately query them. 
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However, the defendant must know of those elements of the transaction 
that would render his participation dishonest by normal standards of 
honest behaviour.70 In addition, the court may take into account his 
personal attributes – such as his experience, intelligence and the reasons 
for acting as he did – in assessing honesty.71 These subjective elements 
remain relevant because it is ultimately his subjective mental state that is 
being assessed, albeit by reference to objective standards.72 
22 Because claims based on dishonest assistance are usually 
resisted on the ground that the requisite mental element is absent, legal 
debate has largely focused on the mental aspect of the cause of action. In 
contrast, relatively little has been said about the scope of “assistance”. 
The general view appears to be that “assistance” is to be broadly 
construed since it is the element of dishonesty that effectively constrains 
liability. Thus, the assistance in question need only be of more than 
minimal importance,73 though it must in fact have assisted the fiduciary 
to commit the breach of trust or fiduciary duty.74 Provided these 
requirements are met, there is no further requirement that the assistance 
must inevitably have resulted in loss to the claimant.75 Nor is it necessary 
for assistance to comprise any mental element other than the distinct 
requirement for dishonesty.76 
23 Once the relevant ingredients are established, the dishonest 
assistant is personally liable to account for the breach of trust or 
fiduciary obligation as if he were a fiduciary to the claimant. In general, 
this means that the dishonest assistant will be liable in equity to 
                                                          
70 Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Eurotrust International Ltd [2006] 1 WLR 1467 
at [15]–[16]. 
71 Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Philip Tan Kok Ming [1995] 3 WLR 64 at 74–75. 
72 Abou-Rahmah v Abacha [2007] Bus LR 220 at [16], [66] and [92]; Attorney General 
of Zambia for and on behalf of the Republic of Zambia v Meer Care & Desai [2007] 
EWHC 952 at [334] and [340] (reversed on appeal but with no criticism of the legal 
principles applied: Attorney General of Zambia (for and on behalf of the Republic of 
Zambia) v Meer Care & Desai [2008] EWCA Civ 1007). See also Simon Gardner, 
“Knowing Assistance and Knowing Receipt: Taking Stock” (1996) 112 LQR 56 
at 66, but cf criticisms in Alastair Hudson, Equity and Trusts (Routledge, 8th Ed, 
2015) at pp 990–999. 
73 Baden v Société Général pour Favoriser le Dévéloppement du Commerce et de 
L’Industrie en France SA [1993] 1 WLR 509 at [276]. 
74 Brinks Ltd v Abu-Saleh (No 3) (1995) The Times (23 October). Here, a wife who 
accompanied her husband on various trips to make cash deposits (proceeds of 
stolen goods) at Zurich banks had not “assisted” her husband as she had done no 
more than provide welcome company on long and tiring drives. In George 
Raymond Zage III v Rasif David [2009] 2 SLR(R) 479 at [43], the Singapore Court 
of Appeal also clarified that passive receipt would not, by itself, constitute 
“assistance”. 
75 Baden v Société Général pour Favoriser le Dévéloppement du Commerce et de 
L’Industrie en France SA [1993] 1 WLR 509 at [276]. 
76 Madoff Securities International Ltd v Raven [2014] Lloyd’s Rep 95 at [351]. 
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compensate the claimant for any loss resulting from the breach.77 As far 
as English law is concerned, the Court of Appeal has recently clarified in 
Novoship (UK) Ltd v Mikhaylyuk78 that an assistant may also be liable to 
account for profits made in connection with the assistance rendered 
even in the absence of a corresponding loss suffered by the claimant. 
However, the availability of this remedy as against an assistant is subject 
to considerations different from those that apply to a fiduciary.79 First, 
an assistant is only liable to account for any profit made as a result of his 
participation.80 There must, in other words, be a sufficient causal link 
between the profits made and the assistance rendered. For this purpose, 
the common law rules on causation, remoteness and measure of 
damages apply by analogy,81 so a simple “but-for” link may not suffice.82 
In contrast, a fiduciary’s duty to account is not dependent on proof of 
common law causation. It is sufficient that the profits were made in 
connection with conduct that fell within the scope of his fiduciary 
duty,83 and it is no defence that he would have made the profits even if 
there had been no breach.84 Second, while a fiduciary is bound to 
account for any profit that he makes in connection with a breach of 
fiduciary duty, the assistant’s liability to account is subject to the court’s 
discretion. Thus, the court may withhold the remedy if it deems it to be 
“disproportionate in relation to the particular form and extent of 
wrongdoing”.85 As the assistant has not, unlike the fiduciary, assumed 
any obligation of single-minded loyalty to the beneficiary, the strict 
rules for profit-stripping cannot be justified.86 
24 To sum up, accessory liability is indubitably a part of equity’s 
landscape but it is not duplicative in nature. The liabilities of the 
accessory need not mirror those of the fiduciary because they are 
ultimately accounting for distinct wrongs. This is so even if the former’s 
liability is a derivative of the latter. A further point to note is that while 
equity’s conception of accessory liability is broadly similar to that in 
                                                          
77 Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Philip Tan Kok Ming [1995] 3 WLR 64. 
78 [2015] 2 WLR 526, relying (inter alia) on Consul Development Pty Lyd v DPC 
Estates Pty Ltd (1975) 132 CLR 373 at 397. See also Fiffyes Group Ltd v Templeman 
[2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 643. 
79 Cf Canada Safeway Ltd v Thompson [1951] 3 DLR 295, which held several 
assistants jointly and severally liable for their own as well as the defendant’s profits 
for the latter’s breach of fiduciary duty. The author is grateful to her colleague 
Assistant Professor Yip Man for drawing her attention to this case. 
80 Novoship (UK) Ltd v Mikhaylyuk [2015] 2 WLR 526 at [94]–[95]. 
81 Novoship (UK) Ltd v Mikhaylyuk [2015] 2 WLR 526 at [107]. 
82 Novoship (UK) Ltd v Mikhaylyuk [2015] 2 WLR 526 at [108] and [114]. 
83 United Pan-Europe Communications NV v Deutsche Bank AG [2000] 2 BCLC 461 
at [47]; Murad v Al-Saraj [2005] WTLR 1573 at [57]; Button v Phelps [2006] 
EWHC 53 at [66]. 
84 Murad v Al-Saraj [2005] WTLR 1573 at [67]. 
85 Novoship (UK) Ltd v Mikhaylyuk [2015] 2 WLR 526 at [119]. 
86 Novoship (UK) Ltd v Mikhaylyuk [2015] 2 WLR 526 at [104]. 
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criminal law, the mental elements of both forms of action differ: an 
accessory in equity must have acted dishonestly, but a criminal 
accessory need only have acted with knowledge of the elements of the 
offence.87 Although the two standards may converge in practice because 
an assistant with actual or blind-eye knowledge of the elements of a 
breach of trust will often be regarded as dishonest, dishonesty is 
nevertheless a distinct concept that connotes a higher degree of moral 
culpability. 
IV. Tort and equity compared 
25 If one focuses only on the conceptual bases on which 
participatory liability is imposed, the approaches adopted in tort and 
equity appear contrastingly different, for while accessory liability is long 
regarded as elemental in equity, tort law has shunned it in favour of joint 
tortfeasance. The two concepts are, as seen above, distinct in that 
accessory liability recognises the secondary role of the accessory, but 
under joint tortfeasance an assistant will only be liable as a joint-
principal wrongdoer if he has acted pursuant to a common design. This 
difference has engendered the impression that participatory liability in 
tort law – given that it does not recognise accessory liability for knowing 
assistance with another’s tort – is narrower than that in equity.88 
26 However, when one turns to consider their substantive 
application as outlined above, the difference between the two regimes 
may in fact be slender. Despite the distinct conceptual tools employed, 
acts of assistance and facilitation that are more than de minimis are 
adequate modes of participation in both contexts. Having adopted this 
liberal definition of the conduct element, both regimes then rely on 
narrow (albeit dissimilar) mental states to restrict liability. Thus, in 
neither context is mere knowledge thought to be sufficient. It may be 
that the divergent theoretical underpinnings of the two regimes will 
entail different remedial consequences,89 but that aside, it will seem that 
                                                          
87 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 6th Ed, 
2009) at p 415. In Singapore, s 107(c) of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) 
provides that a person must have acted “intentionally” to be liable for abetment. 
88 Fish & Fish Ltd v Sea Shepherd UK [2013] 1 WLR 3700 at [42]. See also Joachim 
Dietrich, “Accessorial Liability in the Law of Torts” (2011) 31 Legal Studies 231 
at 245. 
89 Joint tortfeasors are liable for the whole of the claimant’s recoverable loss 
regardless of their contribution to the tort. In equity, an accessory is also liable for 
the whole loss resulting from the fiduciary breach but is accountable only for his 
own gain and not that of the fiduciary (as discussed at para 23 above). 
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participatory (and in particular, assistant) liability in both tort and 
equity are similarly restrictive in scope.90 
27 So viewed, there is in fact substantial convergence in the 
manner by which equity and tort regulate third party participatory 
liability despite their different formulations. This is unsurprising given 
that both regimes are, at one level of generality, concerned with a single 
phenomenon (viz, to ascribe responsibility for wrongful contribution to 
another’s wrong). Though the two regimes differ in their conceptual 
bases (accessorial liability versus joint tortfeasance) and mental 
components (dishonesty versus common intent), these differences are 
explicable by their contexts. In equity, the express trust is the paradigm 
equitable relationship. A stranger who assists with a breach of trust can 
only be liable as an accessory for his own assistance but not as a joint 
trustee91 since he has not assumed any obligation as a trustee.92 For that 
reason, liability for dishonest assistance has to be structurally distinct 
from joint tortfeasance.93 Likewise, the choice of “dishonesty” as the 
relevant fault element appears apt as against the trust paradigm because 
the misapplication of another’s property is intuitively improper. Tort law, 
on the other hand, prescribes minimum standards of behaviour in a 
wide range of contexts so liability is imposed rather than assumed. Freed 
from any structural constraint, it could and did insist that participatory 
liability be limited on the basis of joint tortfeasance. Intention, rather 
than dishonesty, is also the more appropriate measure of fault given the 
diverse conduct and interests that tort law seeks to (respectively) 
regulate and protect. 
28 While some may dismiss these contextual variances as the 
accidental and anomalous consequences of rigid categorisation in 
                                                          
90 Hence, Lord Sumption’s observation that knowing assistance for breach of trust “is 
not in reality a broader basis of liability” because “knowledge is only relevant to 
establish dishonesty”: see Sea Shepherd UK v Fish & Fish Ltd [2015] 2 WLR 694 
at [39]. 
91 This is so even though he is regularly described as a “constructive trustee”. The 
accessory is not a trustee in the true sense since he does not hold any property on 
trust but is simply liable to account by reason of his assistance: Paragon Finance 
plc v DB Thakerar & Co [1999] 1 All ER 400 at 409. 
92 Except where he has so conducted himself as to be liable as a trustee de son tort. 
93 Duncan Sheehan, “Disentangling Equitable Personal Liability for Receipt and 
Assistance” (2008) 16 RLR 41 at 56. The same structural constraint applies to 
contracts, which explains why a stranger to a contract cannot be “jointly” liable for 
a breach of contract: see Robert Stevens, Torts and Rights (Oxford University Press, 
2007) at pp 275–276. For the same reason, Baughen characterises accessory liability 
for contract and fiduciary obligation as “mixed” or “indirect” joint liability: see 
Simon Baughen, “Accessory Liability at Common Law and in Equity – The 
Redundancy of Knowing Assistance’ Revisited” [2007] LMCLQ 545 at 556–557. 
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private law,94 an alternative (and, it is submitted, better) view is to see 
them as evidence of a consistently restrictive approach towards 
participatory liability in civil law. Such liability has to be narrowly 
delimited because it would otherwise unduly encroach upon a person’s 
right to do things that are in themselves entirely lawful.95 To that end, 
the common law when presented with a choice of different conceptual 
tools selects, in that context, the most restrictive tool that would both 
recognise the claimant’s right to redress and protect the participant 
against undue interference. Though this results in the use of varying 
concepts in different contexts, the law as a whole is nevertheless 
coherent, unified by the overriding concern of optimising the 
participant’s right to engage in lawful activities. 
29 Of course, it may be asked if this unity can be taken further. 
Given that civil participatory liability may broadly be seen as a single 
phenomenon, and that substantial overlap already exists across different 
contexts, is there not a case for further assimilation in the interest of 
consistency and simplicity? In the next section, the key arguments made 
in favour of such a development are considered.96 
V. The case for assimilation 
30 Proponents of a unified approach contend that a common 
principle is already at work throughout private law and therefore such a 
principle should be explicitly recognised so as to render the law more 
logical and just. The case for assimilation is put forth most forcefully by 
Cooper and Davies, both of whom have sought to draw from disparate 
areas of private law to reveal an underlying unity in the law that was 
hitherto obscure. Both accounts are detailed, insightful and clearly merit 
careful study. An article of this brevity cannot do justice to these 
important works by attempting to summarise them here. The discussion 
that follows will therefore highlight only those arguments most 
pertinent to the present discussion. 
31 A notable consensus among those favouring assimilation is that 
knowing assistance ought to be a sufficient basis for imposing accessory 
liability in civil law.97 Although general accessory liability may be 
                                                          
94 Viz, those of tort, contract and equity: see David Cooper, “Secondary Liability for 
Civil Wrongs” PhD thesis, University of Cambridge (1995) at p 1. 
95 Sea Shepherd UK v Fish & Fish Ltd [2015] 2 WLR 694 at [39]. In equity, this 
restrictive attitude is said to be evident even in the foundational case of Barnes v 
Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244: see Charles Harpum, “The Stranger as Constructive 
Trustee: Part 1” (1986) 102 LQR 114 at 146. 
96 See paras 30–36 below. 
97 See Philip Sales, “The Tort of Conspiracy and Civil Secondary Liability” (1990) 49 
Camb LJ 491 at 507–510; David Cooper, “Secondary Liability for Civil Wrongs” 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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justified on various grounds,98 liability for knowing assistance is 
commonly defended by analogising with criminal law. As previously 
noted,99 the argument is that since criminal law recognises liability for 
aiding, abetting, counselling and procuring a crime, civil law should 
likewise recognise accessory liability in the same circumstances.100 If this 
were not the case, odd results may follow. For example, to deny 
assistance liability in tort when the same conduct constitutes a criminal 
offence may lead to an unjust outcome, a point strikingly illustrated by 
this passage in Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort:101 
D1 is attacking C. D2, a malicious bystander, throws a knife to D1, 
with which D1 stabs C. It seems extraordinary to suggest that D2 is 
not civilly liable for C’s injury. Yet it is difficult to see there is 
procurement, common design or conspiracy. 
Indeed, the case for consistent treatment may appear even more 
compelling when one considers the fact that criminal liability is subject 
to a higher standard of proof, attracts greater stigma and imposes more 
severe penalties.102 Where criminal liability is established against this 
higher yardstick, should not civil (usually compensatory) liability then 
follow as a matter of course? 
                                                                                                                               
PhD thesis, University of Cambridge (1995) at p 2; and Paul Davies, Accessory 
Liability (Hart Publishing, 1st Ed, 2015) ch 9. However, they differ in their 
conception of what other modes of conduct would also suffice for establishing 
liability. For example, Sales and Cooper include conspiracy as a sufficient mode of 
participation but Davies does not: see Philip Sales, “The Tort of Conspiracy and 
Civil Secondary Liability” (1990) 49 Camb LJ 491 at 500–502; David Cooper, 
“Secondary Liability for Civil Wrongs” PhD thesis, University of Cambridge (1995) 
at pp 11–12; and Paul Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart Publishing, 1st Ed, 2015) 
at pp 61–62. 
98 Davies identifies the principles that underlie the general imposition of accessory 
liability in civil law to include, inter alia, responsibility (a person who has 
contributed to another’s injury should bear responsibility for it); culpability 
(one who has acted in a morally culpable manner should be liable); protecting 
rights (to strengthen the rights of the innocent victim); deterrence (to deter third 
parties from participating in the wrongs of others); loss-shifting (to allow a victim 
to shift the burden of loss to culpable persons); and consistency (that one area of 
law should not undermine another): see Paul Davies, Accessory Liability 
(Hart Publishing, 1st Ed, 2015) at pp 12–19. 
99 See para 5 above. 
100 See, eg, Philip Sales, “The Tort of Conspiracy and Civil Secondary Liability” (1990) 
49 Camb LJ 491 at 502–503 and 509–510; David Cooper, “Secondary Liability for 
Civil Wrongs” PhD thesis, University of Cambridge (1995) at pp 7, 10 and 17; and 
Paul Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart Publishing, 1st Ed, 2015) at pp 19, 21–22 and 
216–218. 
101 W V H Rogers, Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 18th Ed, 
2010) at para 14–23, cited in Paul Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart Publishing, 
1st Ed, 2015) at p 189. 
102 Philip Sales, “The Tort of Conspiracy and Civil Secondary Liability” (1990) 
49 Camb LJ 491 at 509–510; Paul Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart Publishing, 
1st Ed, 2015) at p 216. 
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32 To conceive of civil and criminal assistant liability as 
co-extensive regimes may, however, extend civil accessory liability in 
two ways. First, acts of assistance may be enlarged to include 
encouragement and even advice in the civil context,103 as is the case in 
criminal law.104 Second, substituting knowledge for common intent in 
tort law and dishonesty in equity lowers the standard of culpability 
required to establish liability in both contexts. However, Davies has 
argued that such a scheme would not unduly extend liability as liability 
may be restricted by restricting knowledge to actual knowledge and 
wilful blindness,105 and by developing the defence of justification.106 
These suggestions will be considered in turn. 
33 Once the conduct element is broadly construed to include all 
forms of participation that contributed to the primary wrong, the 
burden of restricting liability falls on the mental component. For 
Cooper and Davies, this function is adequately served by requiring 
proof of subjective knowledge, viz, that of actual or blind-eye 
knowledge.107 Analogising with criminal law, they suggest that D must 
know that PW intends to commit acts that constitute the primary wrong 
with the relevant culpable state of mind.108 D must also know that his 
conduct will have some causative connection with the commission of 
the primary wrong.109 So defined, “knowledge” is preferable to “common 
design” as the latter has the tendency to (unduly) restrict liability to 
instances of conspiracy.110 “Knowledge” is also a better proxy for 
culpability than “dishonesty” in the context of equity since a person’s 
                                                          
103 Davies argues that acts of advice should suffice as a possible mode of participation: 
see Paul Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart Publishing, 1st Ed, 2015) at p 28. Cooper, 
on the other hand, interprets “encouragement” as conduct that either constitutes 
assistance and/or inducement, but excludes mere advice as a sufficient mode of 
participation: see David Cooper, “Secondary Liability for Civil Wrongs” 
PhD thesis, University of Cambridge (1995) at pp 9–10. 
104 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 6th Ed, 
2009) at pp 407–408. 
105 Paul Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart Publishing, 1st Ed, 2015) at pp 127, 213–215 
and 282. 
106 Paul Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart Publishing, 1st Ed, 2015) at pp 213–215, 222 
and 282. 
107 David Cooper, “Secondary Liability for Civil Wrongs” PhD thesis, University of 
Cambridge (1995) at pp 17–19; Paul Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart Publishing, 
1st Ed, 2015) at p 53. 
108 David Cooper, “Secondary Liability for Civil Wrongs” PhD thesis, University of 
Cambridge (1995) at p 18; Paul Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart Publishing, 
1st Ed, 2015) at p 43. 
109 David Cooper, “Secondary Liability for Civil Wrongs” PhD thesis, University of 
Cambridge (1995) at p 18; Paul Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart Publishing, 
1st Ed, 2015) at p 43. 
110 David Cooper, “Secondary Liability for Civil Wrongs” PhD thesis, University of 
Cambridge (1995) at p 25; Paul Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart Publishing, 
1st Ed, 2015) at p 205. 
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honesty is ultimately founded on his knowledge. The concept of 
“dishonesty” thus adds little to the analysis, and may even be conducive 
to error.111 
34 As a further measure to contain liability, Davies contends there 
should be a broad defence of justification that applies to accessory 
liability for all types of civil wrongs.112 Although the contours of this 
defence have yet to be defined, Davies identifies five situations where 
this defence could arise.113 For present purposes, it suffices to briefly 
consider two of the categories, viz, situations where the defendant has 
acted to protect a superior or equal right, and where he is acting to 
discharge a duty owed to a third party.114 The first-mentioned category is 
currently recognised principally in the contractual context, where it is 
established that a person may be justified in inducing a breach of 
contract if he had done so to protect an equal or superior right.115 Once 
extended, the application of this defence will depend not on the context 
(that is, whether it is tort, contract or equity) but on the rank of the 
interest that the defendant seeks to protect. This presupposes that 
private law recognises a hierarchy in the interests it protects. Davies 
gives the example of a defendant who participates in a nuisance because 
he was threatened with bodily harm if he did not.116 The defendant’s 
participation would be justified as he was merely acting to protect his 
(superior) right to bodily integrity. 
35 An accessory’s participation may also be justified if it was 
committed for the purpose of performing a duty owed to a third party. 
                                                          
111 Paul Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart Publishing, 1st Ed, 2015) at p 121, citing 
Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164 at [134], per Lord Millet. 
112 Paul Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart Publishing, 1st Ed, 2015) at p 222. Cooper 
also considered the defences applicable to the accessory but did not advocate their 
expansion: see David Cooper, “Secondary Liability for Civil Wrongs” PhD thesis, 
University of Cambridge (1995) ch 6. 
113 See generally Paul Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart Publishing, 1st Ed, 2015) ch 7. 
114 The other categories are situations involving the supply of staple articles of 
commerce, the protection of public morals and statutory justification. 
115 Edwin Hill & Partners v First National Finance Corp plc [1989] 1 WLR 255. In this 
case, the defendant bankers had lent money to a developer secured by a first legal 
charge over the latter’s property. When the developer required further financing, 
the defendant agreed to provide the necessary funding on the condition that 
developer dismiss the plaintiff architects to appoint a more prestigious firm of 
architects. The developer reluctantly acceded to this request. On the plaintiff’s suit 
for inducing breach of contract, it was held that the defendant’s conduct was 
justified. This was because as legal chargee, the defendant could in any case have 
recalled the loan and enforced the security, which would also have resulted in the 
termination of the plaintiff’s contract. So in procuring the breach of the plaintiff’s 
contract, the defendant was really doing no more than protecting its equal or 
superior right as legal chargee. 
116 Paul Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart Publishing, 1st Ed, 2015) at p 233. 
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This defence may explain why a police officer is not liable for 
encouraging a primary wrongdoer to disclose confidential information 
if the disclosure would assist in the prevention of crime117 or why a 
director who authorised a company’s breach of contract is not liable for 
inducing breach of contract.118 In each case, the accessory’s conduct is 
justified because he owes a prior (respectively employment and 
fiduciary) duty to another. 
36 The foregoing suggests that a unified principle of accessory 
liability may be achieved by adopting across private law a uniform 
definition of the mental and conduct elements constituting liability, and 
of the defences available to an accessory. This approach has the merits of 
forging coherence and consistency across civil and criminal law. Both 
Cooper and Davies also maintain that such an approach would not 
result in an over-inclusive regime that unfairly inhibits freedom of 
action.119 However, adopting this approach will necessitate adjustments 
to existing principles. Specifically, “knowing assistance” will have to be 
recognised as a sufficient basis for liability in both tort and equity. 
VI. Reasons for differentiation 
37 At its core, the case for assimilation rests on the familiar adage 
that “like cases should be treated alike”: consistency is good because it 
leads to fairness. However, in practical terms, this adage is of value only 
if there is consensus on what cases may be treated as like cases, and what 
is a fair rule to apply to such cases. Those who favour assimilation place 
considerable weight on the structural similarity of all “accessory” cases 
as the chief reason for treating such cases alike: in each case a person is 
held responsible for participating in a wrong that he may not have 
“caused”. However, there are other structural and procedural distinctions 
between different legal domains (particularly that between civil and 
                                                          
117 Paul Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart Publishing, 1st Ed, 2015) at p 234. 
118 On the principle of Said v Butt [1920] 3 KB 497. Although Davies seeks to 
rationalise this decision as an instance of justification (see Paul Davies, Accessory 
Liability (Hart Publishing, 1st Ed, 2015) at pp 234–238), it is suggested that a 
simpler explanation is that it is merely a consequence of contractual privity. 
A person who contracts with a company ought to normally look to the company 
alone as the person responsible for its performance or breach. The fact that a 
company necessarily acts through a human agent should not render such agents 
liable under the contract. However, the agent may be liable for inducing breach if 
he did not act in good faith and is, in that limited sense, not completely immune 
from liability. Cf, however, David Cooper, “Secondary Liability for Civil Wrongs” 
PhD thesis, University of Cambridge (1995) at p 170 for criticisms of this 
explanation. 
119 David Cooper, “Secondary Liability for Civil Wrongs” PhD thesis, University of 
Cambridge (1995) at pp 2–3; Paul Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart Publishing, 
1st Ed, 2015) at pp 214–215 and 285. 
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criminal law) that may justify variations in the formulations of accessory 
liability in different contexts. These distinctions ought to be kept in view 
when evaluating the call for fusion. 
38 Although there is considerable overlap between torts and 
crimes, the two types of legal wrongs serve fundamentally different 
ends. Criminal law is largely concerned with censuring and deterring 
conduct that represents a serious transgression of shared social values. 
A conviction also carries with it greater social stigma, and is followed by 
more punitive sanctions. Tort law, on the other hand, protects personal 
rights and interests by mediating between conflicts when they arise.120 It 
aims to redress rather than condemn. Owing to these differences, the 
paradigm of crime is serious intentional wrongdoing,121 whilst that of 
tort is the failure to meet a prescribed level of conduct – typically that of 
negligence.122 In general, therefore, the threshold of liability in tort is 
lower than that in crime. That being the case, applying the same breadth 
of accessory liability to tort and crime may lead to a greater expansion of 
liability in tort. For instance, accessory liability for theft is in one sense 
restricted by the requirement that the accessory must have known of the 
thief ’s dishonest intention, but no equivalent check applies if accessory 
liability were imposed on the same basis for conversion. All that needs 
to be proved is that the accessory has rendered assistance with the 
knowledge that the converter is dealing inconsistently with another’s 
title to goods. Where the converter has acted honestly (but is 
nevertheless liable for conversion), it is not clear that the victim’s loss 
should automatically be sheeted to third parties who had knowingly 
assisted the converter. Similarly, criminal liability for breach of trust is 
usually predicated on dishonesty but civil liability is not. An equally 
liberal approach to accessory liability in both contexts may thus lead to 
more extensive liability in equity. So while a criminal offence and a civil 
wrong may broadly be seen as analogues when they address the same 
conduct or harm, it does not follow that they are necessarily “like” cases 
that warrant identical treatment for purposes of accessory liability. 
39 Another crucial distinction is that criminal proceedings are 
initiated and controlled by the State. In practice, the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion is guided by two main considerations: the 
                                                          
120 Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] 1 AC 962 at [17]–[18]. 
121 See Grant Lamond, “What is a Crime?” (2007) 27 OxJLS 609. According to 
Lamond, strict liability offences constitute a different paradigm which performs a 
function different from those of conventional common law crimes. 
122 Peter Cane, “Mens Rea in Tort Law” (2000) 20 OxJLS 533 at 552–553. This is not to 
deny that intentional conduct does have a role in tort, only that its role is relatively 
minor role compared to that of negligence. 
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sufficiency of evidence and public interests.123 So it is not the case that 
every reported offence will be prosecuted. In particular, it is unlikely 
that the Prosecution would expend valuable public resources to 
prosecute technical or trivial transgressions. Thus, the risk of excessive 
liability is likely minimal even when a broader regime of accessorial 
liability is adopted in respect of crimes. This relative breadth may also 
be needed for the pragmatic purpose of overcoming difficulties of 
proof124 so as to effectively facilitate the deterrence of serious crimes. In 
contrast, civil wrongs are privately enforced. The merits of an expansive 
regime must therefore be evaluated against the increased risk of 
“defendant shopping”. Although it is true that a claim based on venial 
participation is unlikely to succeed even in the civil context, the mere 
threat of litigation will almost certainly put the threatened party to 
trouble and expense, and in some cases bring pressure to bear on him to 
settle. 
40 As noted, the harmonised approach as envisioned by Cooper 
and Davies is underpinned by the belief that a tight notion of knowledge 
is sufficient to reign in liability. However, equity’s experience suggests 
that exclusive reliance on “knowledge” breeds uncertainty once it is 
extended beyond actual knowledge to encompass constructive 
knowledge.125 Even if knowledge were restricted to blind-eye or 
Nelsonian knowledge, the question will arise as to what it is the 
defendant must have known to warrant the inference of such 
knowledge. Focusing thus on the quality of the defendant’s knowledge 
will likely revive some of the difficulties associated with the Baden 
scale126 because “knowledge” (mis)directs attention to discrete facts 
when the true objective is the identification of a range along a 
continuum of an increasingly blameworthy state of mind.127 Dishonesty, 
by contrast, provides an external standard by which that identification 
may be made. That is not to deny the importance of knowledge as a 
basis for inferring dishonesty, but only to emphasise that it is not always 
a sufficient means of identifying culpability.128 At the margins where the 
                                                          
123 See Kumaralingam Armirthalingam, “Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecutorial 
Guidelines” [2013] Sing JLS 50 at 58. On the fetters of prosecutorial discretion, see 
Gary Chan, “Prosecutorial Discretion and the Legal Limits in Singapore” (2013) 
25 SAcLJ 15. 
124 Resulting from the higher standard of proof and more stringent rules on 
admissibility of evidence. 
125 Fish & Fish Ltd v Sea Shepherd UK [2013] 1 WLR 3700 at [44]. 
126 Baden v Société Général pour Favoriser le Dévéloppement du Commerce et de 
L’Industrie en France SA [1993] 1 WLR 509 at [250]. 
127 Charles Mitchell, “Assistance” in Breach of Trust (Peter Birks & Arianna Pretto eds) 
(Hart Publishing, 2002) at pp 194–195. 
128 Indeed, it is noteworthy that even in the context of crime, there is some 
recognition that a stricter mental component is justifiable: see United Kingdom, 
Law Commission, Participating in Crime (Cmnd 7084, May 2007) at para 3.5. 
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underlying fiduciary breach is not unambiguously motivated by bad 
faith, the test of dishonesty helps to isolate the type of knowledge that 
would render an assistant culpable.129 
41 It is plausible, as Davies suggests, that a broad defence of 
justification may curb any excessive encroachment on personal freedom 
resulting from an expanded regime of accessory liability. However, this 
model of liability effectively shifts the burden of justification to the 
defendant. Davies considers this allocation of burden defensible, for:130 
… [it] is not unduly onerous for such defendants to bear the burden of 
justifying their actions: it should be recognised that it is prima facie 
wrong knowingly to participate in wrongdoing, and therefore 
legitimate to require a defendant to justify such conduct. 
Thus, Davies suggests that a checkout cashier in a supermarket who sells 
a can of spray paint to a tortfeasor knowing that the latter intends to use 
it to graffiti a neighbour’s wall is prima facie liable as an accessory but 
would nevertheless be allowed to justify her action since it is carried out 
pursuant to an employment obligation.131 Equally, a turnstile operator of 
a stadium who admits spectators knowing that they will inevitably cause 
a nuisance may be similarly justified.132 However, it is not obvious why 
the checkout assistant or the turnstile operator should be put to the 
trouble of having to justify their actions in the first place or, more 
fundamentally, why the mere fact of knowledge should taint an 
otherwise lawful act in these circumstances. In effect, such a regime 
places upon ordinary traders and their agents the duty to police the 
activities of their customers. Whether this strikes an appropriate balance 
between the traders’ freedom and the victim’s interests is a question that 
will require careful calibration in each context, and thus militates against 
the adoption of a general principle that is context-insensitive. 
42 Finally, it may fairly be contended that participatory liability is 
not under-inclusive in tort law even though stricter concepts are 
employed in this context. One reason is, as seen above,133 that the 
requirement of “common design” has been extended to include common 
intent, and such intention may sometimes be inferred from the 
                                                          
129 See Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Phlip Tan Kok Ming [1995] 3 WLR 64 at 74. 
On this view, dishonesty is not a redundant concept as Davies contended: see Paul 
Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart Publishing, 1st Ed, 2015) at p 122. 
130 Paul Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart Publishing, 1st Ed, 2015) at p 222. 
131 Paul Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart Publishing, 1st Ed, 2015) at p 239. 
132 Paul Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart Publishing, 1st Ed, 2015) at p 240. However, 
Davies also acknowledges that the operator’s act may be too insignificant to 
constitute accessory liability in the first place: see Paul Davies, Accessory Liability 
(Hart Publishing, 1st Ed, 2015) at p 215. 
133 See discussion at paras 15–19 above. 
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participant’s conduct. Where the primary tort is clearly also criminal, 
the participant’s knowing assistance would usually also support a 
finding that he has intended the commission of the tort. So returning to 
the example cited above,134 the malicious bystander, D2, would in all 
likelihood be liable as a joint tortfeasor with D1 because he has clearly 
intended that D1 would stab C with the knife. It is therefore probable 
that the ambit of joint tortfeasorship would in practice approximate 
(and even exceed)135 that of criminal accessory liability in so far as the 
underlying wrong is in the nature of a serious crime. A second reason 
why tortious participatory liability is not under-inclusive even in the 
absence of an overarching principle of accessory liability is that the 
appropriate boundary of such liability has, to a large extent, already been 
drawn in the elements of the primary torts. So it is well established, for 
example, that the tort of defamation may be committed by anyone who 
has knowingly participated in the publication of a libellous statement 
either as a primary or secondary publisher.136 Likewise, a person may 
also be liable for nuisance if he has authorised or directly and actively 
participated in another’s nuisance.137 Where the primary wrong is one of 
negligence, the liability of a person who has induced or encouraged the 
tort is also more appropriately analysed as a form of primary and direct 
liability for negligence. To apply accessory principles in this context 
would inappropriately subvert the policy concerns that underpin the 
tort of negligence.138 
43 These considerations demonstrate that there may be 
fundamental differences in the ingredients and processes governing civil 
and criminal liability that may warrant a more nuanced treatment of 
accessory in each context. A standard approach that applies in all 
contexts may appear simpler and more rational, but it may also blunt the 
law’s agility in mediating conflicting rights and interests. 
VII. Conclusion 
44 Although participatory liability is defined differently in tort and 
equity, the two regimes are largely consistent and coherent. In both 
contexts, acts of assistance that are more than de minimis qualify as a 
sufficient mode of participation, and liability is predicated on a mental 
                                                          
134 See para 31 above. 
135 As was the case in Shah v Gale [2005] EWHC 1087, where a defendant who had 
assisted in the battery and assault of the claimant-victim was acquitted in criminal 
proceedings but was nevertheless liable as a joint tortfeasor. 
136 Bunt v Tilley [2007] 1 WLR 1243; Tamiz v Google Inc [2013] 1 WLR 2151; Oriental 
Press Group Ltd v Fevaworks Solutions Ltd [2014] EMLR 11. 
137 Smith v Scott [1973] Ch 314; Coventry v Lawrence [2014] 3 WLR 555. 
138 See Joachim Dietrich, “Accessorial Liability in the Law of Torts” (2011) 31 Legal 
Studies 231 at 256–257. 
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fault that is more than mere knowledge. Their differences reflect the 
distinct paradigms on which the law was constructed in each context, 
but do not result in material disparity in scope of liability. Advocates of 
further convergence typically argue for alignment by reference to the 
principles of complicity in criminal law, but such arguments overlook 
the evidential, procedural as well as contextual differences between civil 
and criminal law. Coherence and consistency are undoubtedly 
important hallmarks of fair and just rules, but they do not always 
require identical treatment in different contexts. In the absence of strong 
evidence that the existing approaches do lead to unjust outcomes, 
a sweeping reform that requires the overturning of a large corpus of case 
authorities is arguably not warranted. 
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